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Trudeau: Instead of Treated They Get Fees: A Hard Knock Life for Indigent

NOTE
INSTEAD OF TREATED THEY GET FEES:
A HARD KNOCK LIFE FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS AND THE NEED FOR UNBIASED
DETERMINATIONS OF INDIGENT STATUS'
I.

INTRODUCTION

"You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will
be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If
you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you."2 Almost
every American should recognize these words, either from watching a
television program, studying criminal law, or even being placed in the
back of a police car.3 Although every citizen has the right to an attorney,
the right to have one provided is not as absolute as one would think.' An
individual must first meet the test for indigent status in the jurisdiction in
which they were arrested.' Indigent status allows poorer citizens to have
an attorney appointed to them by the court and sometimes get court fees
waived.6 Each state has its own process for determining indigent status
1.

See JAY-Z, Hard Knock Life (Ghetto Anthem), on VOL. 2 ... HARD KNOCK LIFE (D&D

Studios 1998).
2.

Miranda Rights, MIRANDARIGHTS.ORG, http://www.mirandarights.org (last visited Sept.

17, 2019) (emphasis added); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444,478-79 (1966).
3. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478-79; Miranda Rights, supra note 2. These rights
mandated by the Supreme Court have become ubiquitous in American culture, appearing as a popular
and somewhat overused trope within various television shows and movies. See generally MEN IN
BLACK (Columbia Pictures 1997); SHREK 2 (Dreamworks Pictures 2004); Law & Order Special
Victims Unit: Honor (NBC television broadcast Oct. 27, 2000); The Closer: You Are Here (TNT
television broadcast July 25, 2005). The first script listing the rights identified by the Supreme Court
came from a group of California district attorneys in 1966. Nick Keppler, 10 Facts About the Miranda
Warning
You
Have
the
Right
to
Know, MENTAL
FLOSS
(Nov.
4,
2016),
http://mentalfloss.com/article/86769/10-facts-about-miranda-warning-you-have-right-know.
The
script was produced just weeks after the decision in Miranda.Id.
4. See Carrie Savage Phillips, Oklahoma's Indigent Status DeterminationScheme: A Call For

Uniformity, 66 OKLA. L. REv. 655, 657 (2014).
5. See id.
6. See Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their
Court-Appointed Counsel Through Recoupment and Contribution,42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323,

324 (2009).
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and identifying the person who evaluates each case.' Because there are no
required federal standards for states to determine indigent status, there are
a variety of tests that the states use, and most of them give full discretion
to the decision-maker." Due to the fact that the tests in a majority of the
states are completely discretionary with little oversight, two defendants in
the same jurisdiction, with extremely similar circumstances but different
decision-makers, could be given different indigent status determinations.9
Uniformity is not the only issue poor defendants face within the
criminal justice system.'o With a few exceptions, the decision-maker is
usually either the judge or a public defender on the case." Most often, the
12
judge is assigned as the decision-maker. Both judges and public
defenders in many jurisdictions have a conflict of interest in determining
3
whether defendants are eligible for indigent status. In many states, the
revenue from fees collected by courts are accessible by judges and fund
the public defenders' salaries .14 Thus, if the decision-maker finds that the
defendant is able to pay fees, the decision-maker will be able to benefit
from the revenue of those fees." These decisions have critical impacts on
the defendants' lives: If a defendant is incorrectly determined to be able
to pay, and does not pay the fees, they will often receive additional fees
and possibly jail time.1 6
The evaluation and effects of indigent status should be looked at with
more scrutiny, as the poor population in America is consistently
experiencing life-altering repercussions from this country's flawed
judicial system.17 Given the gravity of implications that a wrongful
negative determination or lackluster effect of a positive determination of
indigent status could have on a poor defendant, important and reasonable
should be made to how courts view potential
updates
.18
defendants
indigent
This Note discusses and advocates for the adoption of a model
standard for indigent status determinations.1 9 Part II.A discusses the
7. Phillips, supra note 4, at 687-92.
8. Id. at 657-58, 687-92.
9. Id. at 655.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Phillips, supra note 4, at 687-92.
12. Id.
13. See infra Part
14. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014,
4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.

E.A.
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background and origin of indigent status, particularly through the creation
and imposition of public defenders for these defendants .20 Part II.B
explains how poor citizens face many systematic challenges within the
judicial system, and it shows that public defender appointments are not
the only roadblocks these poor people face. 2 1 Part I11 highlights the
methods and effects of the indigent status tests that are currently
implemented throughout the states. 22 Part IV proposes a model standard
for indigent status determinations, and it details the reasoning behind the
chosen statutory language .23
II.

THE TREATMENT OF POOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WITHIN

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Poor citizens have faced and continue to face systemic problems that
prevent them from bettering their financial status, with many of those
roadblocks being present within the criminal justice system.2 4 This Part
describes the historic progression of the treatment of indigent criminal
defendants by the courts, specifically discussing the case law that
established constitutional protections for an indigent defendant's right to
have a defense attorney through the incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment. 25 This Part also delves into the other barriers poor criminal
defendants face throughout the criminal justice system (besides the
availability of counsel) by highlighting a few controversial policies and
practices: the prevalence of racial discrimination, the resurgence of quasidebtor's prisons, pretrial release conditioned on cash bail, and
incentivized incarceration schemes .26
A.

The JudicialBranch Implementing Protections
on Indigent Defendants

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution protects the rights of
United States citizens regarding various aspects of the legal process .27
These rights include: a speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, and the
assistance of counsel, among others. 28 Before 1932, the Assistance of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(2018).
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See Fred 0. Smith Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REv. 2283, 2285
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
Id.
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Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment was interpreted to only give a
defendant the opportunity to be represented by a private counsel.29 The
Supreme Court began to alter that interpretation in the landmark case of
Powell v. Alabama.30 In 1932, nine young black men were accused of
raping two white teenage girls on a freight train passing through
Alabama. 3 1In Powell, the defendants, who were not from Alabama, were
not given an opportunity to contact their families and could not afford
attorneys.32 The trial judge in Alabama appointed an unprepared attorney
right before trial, which resulted in the defendants being found guilty and
sentenced to death.3 3 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
convictions and found that Alabama had violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting the defendants' ability to
provide themselves effective representation .34 The Court stated that it is
the trial court's duty to provide counsel when a defendant of a capital
crime is "unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness,
35
illiteracy, or the like."

Subsequent jurisprudence viewed this decision narrowly .36 In 1942,
the Court explicitly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
incorporate the Sixth Amendment protections against the states. 3 The
Court reasoned that Powell did not formally incorporate the Sixth
Amendment and that it did not force states to provide counsel for all
criminal defendants .3 Instead, it claimed that the impact of Powell was
confined to the extreme circumstances of the case, which, when viewed
39
ad hoc, constituted a deprivation of procedural due process. The Court
further stressed that the requirement for states to provide assistance of
counsel was limited only to crimes punishable by death, and for
29.

Right to Counsel, FREE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://law.jrank.org/pages/9884/Right-

Counsel.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
30. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31. Id. at 50-51. The accusations arose after a fight broke out between the defendants and a
group of white teenage boys on the train. Id.
32. Id. at 52. Also problematic in the eyes of the Supreme Court was the expediency of the
process and the isolation the defendants faced. Id. They were arrested, detained, indicted, and
subsequently sentenced to death all within two weeks. Id. at 52-53. The defendants' arrests were
highly publicized and met with mobs of angry Alabamians whenever they were transported. Id. at 51.
33. Id. at 52-53. The defendants appealed their convictions and the trial court's decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Id at 50.

34.

Id. at 60, 73. Justice Sutherland did not formally rely on the Assistance of Counsel Clause

of the Sixth Amendment but repeated it throughout the opinion. Id.

35.

Id. at 71.

36.

Right to Counsel, supra note 29.

37.
38.
39.

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,461-62 (1942).
Id. at 461-62.
Id. at 463-64.
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defendants who were both too poor to hire an attorney and incapable of
representing themselves.40
In 1963, in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright,4 1 the Court changed its
position on the matter and expanded the reach of Powell.42 In Gideon, a
Florida man was arrested and charged with breaking and entering. 4 3 At
trial, he asked the court to appoint counsel because he was unable to afford
one, but his request was denied." According to a Florida statute, judges
were only supposed to appoint an attorney to an indigent defendant
accused of a capital crime.45 In its holding, the Court formally overturned
Betts v. Brady 6 and ordered states to supply counsel for all indigent
defendants charged with a felony .41 The Court thereby incorporated the
Sixth Amendment's Assistance of Counsel Clause through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 48 The Court claimed that
the right to assistance by counsel is directly influential on the right to a
fair trial.4 9 The Court concluded that "any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him."so Nearly a decade later, in Argersingerv. Hamlin,'1 the
Court expanded this protection to state indigent defendants charged with
a misdemeanor.5 2
What is clear from the case law following Gideon is that all courts
have an affirmative duty to protect an individual's right to a fair trial, and
they are therefore required to assign an attorney when the defendant
cannot afford one.5 3 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld its
decision that the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental

40. Id.
41. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. Id. at 339 (holding that states must provide an attorney to defendants charged with a felony
if they cannot afford one).

43. Id. at 336.
44. Id. at 337.
45. Id. This statute is consistent with the narrow interpretation holding in Betts and Powell. See

Betts, 316 U.S. at 473; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,71 (1932). After representing himself, Gideon
was found guilty. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. Thereafter, Gideon submitted a petition for habeas corpus,
which was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 337-38. Certiorari was later granted by the
United States Supreme Court. Id.

46. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
47. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (finding that the Court in Betts v. Brady was incorrect "in
concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not [a] fundamental right").

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 344.
51. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
52. Id. at 47.
53. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 661-62 (2002); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 554-55 (1987); Argersinger,407 U.S. at 30.
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.

right,5 4 and the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment is consistent with
the Court's treatment of other constitutional rights." However, neither
Gideon nor the cases following it gave guidance to the states on how to
evaluate whether a defendant qualifies for indigent status.56 This lack of
guidance has resulted in disparities amongst the states regarding the
criteria used, the method of determination, and the decision-maker of
indigent status
B. Poor CitizensAre Subjected to Barrierswithin
the CriminalJustice System
1. Racial Discrimination's Prevalence within the Criminal Justice
System
Impoverished citizens in the United States face systematic challenges
within the judicial system, making it increasingly harder to change their
economic status." Racism is still alive and prevalent in America today,
and the judicial system -particularly the judges-are not immune from
bias . In a 2009 study, three law professors and a magistrate judge
analyzed the prevalence of racial bias within the judiciary and sought to
determine whether it could influence their decision-making.' The study
found that 87% of the white judges who took the test had a "white
preference" throughout the exam. 6 1 This sample of judges who have a
white preference was "statistically significantly stronger" compared to a
sample of white individuals (non-judges) measured in another test. 6 2
Although a judge is not the only individual with bias that defendants will

54. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 661-62; Finley, 481 U.S. at 554-55 (1987); Argersinger, 407 U.S.
at 30.
55. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343. ("[C]ertain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight
amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to
the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.") (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-

44(1936)).
56. See generally Argersinger,407 U.S. at 25; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
57. See Phillips,supra note 4, at 687-92.
58. Smith, supra note 24, at 2285.
59.

See Michelle Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.

137, 137 (2013); Jeffery Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2009).
60. Rachlinski et al., supra note 59, at 1195. The researchers conducted an Implicit Association
Test to 133 judges from various jurisdictions. Id. at 1207-09.
61. Id. at 1210.
62. Id. at 1210-11.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/9

6

Trudeau: Instead of Treated They Get Fees: A Hard Knock Life for Indigent

INSTEAD OF TREATED THEY GET FEES

2019]

1439

face along their path to incarceration, a judge's decision is "the most
important, final, and visible act in the criminal justice process."63
For an illustration of this bias in practice, consider the following:
Statistics show that the prison population in America is "'overwhelmingly
poor' and 'overwhelmingly, people of color."' In 2007, 29% of the
prison population was unemployed, and 59% earned less than one
thousand dollars a month.15 The "line between poverty and racial bias is
very blurred." 66 Minority racial groups are more likely to experience
multidimensional poverty than their white counterparts .67 White males
have a much lesser chance of incarceration during their lifetime when
compared to persons of color. 6 8 Hispanic males have a 17% chance of
incarceration throughout their lifetimes, and black males have a 32%
chance, while white males only face a 5.9% chance .69 Hispanic and black
males represent less than one-third of the general population but make up
more than half of the prison population.7 0 If Hispanic and black people
were arrested at the same rate as their white counterparts, their prison
populations would decline by nearly 40%.71
A survey conducted by the American Bar Association ("ABA") in
1999 showed that 90% of citizens believed that wealthy citizens had an
unfair advantage in court, and 47% of individuals surveyed thought that
minority and poor populations are treated unequally .72 This disparate
treatment of minority and poor citizens within the criminal justice system
is not a recent development; historically, black people were targeted

63.

Rose Matsui Ochi, RacialDiscriminationin Criminal Sentencing, 24 JUDGE'S J. 6,7 (1985).

A minority defendant can also face bias from prosecutors, probation officers, and defense attorneys.

Id. at 12.
64.

Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor:Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors'Prisons,

75 MD. L. REV. 486, 517 (2016) (quoting Kristen D. Levingston & Vicki Tretsky, Debtors'Prisons&

Prisoners' Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POv. L.

POL'Y 187, 188 (2007)).
65. Id. (citing Laurie L. Levenson & Mary Gordon, The Dirty Little Secrets About Pay-to-Stay,
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67, 67 (2007)).
66. Donald C. Nugent, JudicialBias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 49 (1994).
67. RICHARD REEVES, ET AL., FIVE EVILS: MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY AND RACE IN
AMERICA 2,9 (2016).
68. Sobol, supranote 64, at 517.

69.
70.

Id.
Id.

71. Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet
(last visited Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter CriminalJustice FactSheet].
72. Linda Greenhouse, 47% in Poll View Legal System as Unfair to Poor and Minorities,N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/24/us/47-in-poll-view-legal-system-asunfair-to-poor-and-minorities.html.
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through racist policies and laws .7 Some of these laws were explicitly
racist, and others were racist in their application to the public .74
Regardless of their motivations, these laws were used to support a
link between black citizens and crime, and some policymakers referred to
then-newly accessible statistics as proof of black Americans' criminally
dangerous nature.75 This link helped further embolden racist ideologies
already present within American society and culture .76 The older,
obviously racist policies have been replaced by facially neutral policies
with minority and poor citizens suffering from inequitable administration
of the law. 77 For example, in 2016, of all arrests made for drug possession
and distribution, 71% of the defendants were white and 27% were black.7 1
However, when observing sentencing in federal prisons, 22% of the
defendants were white and 38% were black.79 So, although black citizens
only make up 27% of those arrested, they make up 38% of those sentenced
in federal prisons.s0 These socioeconomic disparities make it challenging
for a poor person to remove themself from poverty, as aspects of this
flawed criminal justice system "serve[] as both a direct cause and
consequence of poverty.""
2. Modem-Day Debtors' Prisons
Courts have imposed legal financial obligations on 66% of felons
sentenced to prison and on more than 80% of others convicted of felonies
and misdemeanors. 8 2 When convicted criminal defendants are unable to
pay the fines and fees associated with their representation and convictions,
73. See Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black
Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. OF JUST. 1, 2 (May 2018),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/for-the-record-unjustburden/legacy-downloads/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf.
74. Id. After the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Southern states responded by
passing very harsh laws targeting the newly-freed citizens, including black codes, vagrancy laws, and
convict leasing. Id. at 2. In the years following the civil war, the Northern states were not explicit in
their racist policies. Id. at 2-3. However, neutral criminal laws were enforced disparately against black

citizens. Id.
75. Id. at 3.
76.

Id.

77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Id. at 6. This statistic is probably best explained as the result of policies enacted during the
war on drugs: drug free school zones and mandatory minimum sentencing, among others. Id.
79. Id. In the state prison system, both white and black citizens were sentenced at an equal
thirty-one percent. Id.

80.

Id.

81. Rebecca Vallas & Sharon Dietrich, One Strike and You're Out: How We Can Eliminate
Barriers to Economic Security and Mobility for People with Criminal Records, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS 1, 1 (Dec. 2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Vallas
CriminalRecordsReport.pdf.

82.

Sobol, supra note 64, at 508.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss4/9

8

Trudeau: Instead of Treated They Get Fees: A Hard Knock Life for Indigent

INSTEAD OF TREATED THEY GET FEES

2019]

1441

many choose an alternative to paying if their jurisdictions offer it." Many
state and local judicial systems allow convicted defendants to work off
their court debts by doing community service .4 Although on occasion the
defendants are able to avoid paying off a significant debt, the programs
often require the defendants to work many hours a week at minimum wage
with any proceeds raised going directly to their debt." This is problematic
for many individuals who are already in poverty: How can they work to
get themselves out of poverty when they are already working full-time
hours to pay off a court debt?" These lost hours could have been
contributed towards utility bills, groceries, or other daily

living expenses .87
Some critique these harsh penalizations for failing to pay fees and
they further criticize "voluntary" debt relief programs as a continuation of
the long-ago rejected institution of debtors' prisons." Records of
operational debtors' prisons go as far back as biblical times, and their
popularity "ebbed and flowed" throughout much of history. 9 The practice
of imprisoning debtors became a common practice in America in the late
eighteenth century.9 0 This system caused large amounts of incarceration
when America's economy declined. 91 States began to enact legislation
abolishing debtors' prisons, beginning with Kentucky in 1821 .92 The first
federal law banning these prisons was not enacted until 1933.93
Although laws banning imprisonment for debt are active in every
state and at the federal level, failure to pay criminal justice debt-like
fees, fines, and restitution charges-is still a significant reason for
incarceration in today's judicial system. 94 These modern debtor's prison
practices arise in four different contexts: (1) courts will punish a defendant
who fails to pay criminal justice debt by revoking or withholding their
83. Rebecca Beitsch, An Alternative to Paying Court Debt: Working It Off, PEW CHARITABLE
TRS. (Apr. 4,2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/04/04/
an-altemative-to-paying-court-debt-working-it-off.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

88. ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON BLDG. PUB. TR. IN THE AM. JUST. SYs., TEN
GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES & FEES 2, 3 (Aug. 2018) [hereinafter ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE]; Sobol, supra note 64, at 494; Beitsch, supra note 83.

89.
90.

Sobol, supra note 64, at 494-95.
Id. at 496.

91. Id. at 497. Thousands of poor debtors were incarcerated in 1797 when a financial crisis
occurred. Id. This epidemic led to the first bankruptcy law protecting merchant debtors but not layperson debtors. Id.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 498.
94. See id. at 506.
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probation or parole; (2) defendants may be incarcerated for failing to pay
criminal justice debt; (3) defendants are forced to choose whether to serve
prison time or pay their debt, which often is not much of a choice
considering the defendants' financial situations; and (4) law officials will
arrest individuals who have failed to pay criminal justice debt and hold
them in jail until an ability-to-pay hearing. 95 Today, courts will comply
with the law as long as there is some assessment into the defendant's
ability to pay.96 In later sections, this Note will discuss how these statespecific ability-to-pay measures, while seemingly well-intended, yield
inconsistent and often problematic results .97
3. Pre-Trial Release Condition on Cash Bail
Each year, thousands of citizens are arrested and detained prior to
being found guilty of any crime. 98 This can occur simply because poor
defendants are often unable to pay the bail imposed by the judge prior to
trial.99 This policy more often than not allows for wealthier defendants to
navigate the criminal justice system with fewer restrictions on their
liberty. 0 0 For example, a rich defendant charged with rape could spend
the days leading up to trial in his home, whereas a poor defendant charged
with trespassing could spend weeks in jail before trial.101
Richard Stanford was a sixty-three-year-old war veteran when he
was arrested for trespassing in 2017.102 He had no money and was living
with his daughter who had little disposable income.1 03 Because he could
not afford his $2600 bail bond, he spent three weeks in jail until he would
appear in court again.1 0 4 At court, he was asked to choose between
pleading guilty (being released based on time-served) or pleading not

95. See id.; Rebekah Diller, Court FeesAs Revenue?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 30,2008),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/court-fees-revenue.

96.

Sobol, supra note 64, at 507.

97. See infra Part II.B.
98. Arpit Gupta & Ethan Frenchman, The US Bail System Punishes the Poorand Rewards the
Rich, QUARTz (Feb. 2, 2017), https://qz.com/900777/the-us-bail-system-punishes-the-poor-andrewards-the-rich.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Compare id., with Matt Hamilton, Former Stanford Swimmer Accused of Raping
PM),
9:16
2015,
27,
(Jan.
TIMES
LA.
Campus,
on
Woman
Unconscious
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-former-stanford-swimmer-accused-of-rape20150127-story.html. These examples are not offered as hypotheticals but instead are real-life cases
evidencing what is essentially a sanction on poverty. Gupta & Frenchman,supra note 98; Hamilton,
supra.
102.

Gupta & Frenchman, supra note 98.

103. Id.
104. Id.
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guilty and going back to jail to await his next court appearance. 0 5 He, like
many others in his situation, was desperate to return to society, and as a result,
pled guilty.' 06
Consider the more tragic case of Kalief Browder, a New York
teenager who was wrongfully arrested for allegedly stealing a backpack. 0 7
He was in jail at Riker's Island for three years while he awaited trial
because he could not afford to post bail. 08 During Kalief s three-year
pretrial "sentence," he spent the majority of his time in solitary
confinement and suffered various forms of abuse.' 09 Multiple times, he
requested and was denied approval to speak with mental health
professionals about the stress he was undergoing." 0 When he tried to
commit suicide in prison, the guards punished him by taking away his
sheets, books, and "starv[ing him] for two or three [d]ays.""' When
offered a deal to plead guilty in return for time-served, Kalief rejected the
offer because he wanted to maintain his innocence." 2 His case was
dismissed at trial, and two years later, as a result of the psychological
trauma he suffered in prison, Kalief killed himself." 3
Like debtors' prisons, the practice of cash bail is not a new idea, but
its implementation has evolved throughout the years." 4 Originally,
defendants were required to find someone to post bail as a surety, in case
they fled before a guilty verdict.' '1 This practice, with origins in England,
gained popularity among the American colonies and was incorporated
into the American system.1 6 In recent years, surety-based bail has

105. Id.
106. Id. However, there are defendants who refuse to admit guilt when they are innocent, thus
imposing them to more unjustified detention. See Magaret Talbot, The Case Against Cash Bail, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-case-against-cash-bail.
107. P.R. Lockhart, New York's Justice System FailedKalief Browder. Now the City Will Pay

His Family $33 Million, Vox (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/25/18196524/kaliefbrowder-estate-settlement-new-york-rikers.

108. Id. More specifically, Kalief's family could not initially afford to pay the $3000 bail, and
even after they successfully raised the funds, the judge said Kalief no longer qualified for bail. Id.
109. Jillian Weinberger & Arwa Gunja, The High Cost of Delayed Justice, TAKEAWAY (June
10, 2015), https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/kalief-browder-and-juvenile-justice-system.

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Almost four years since his death, Kalief's estate eventually settled the case brought
against New York City for $3.3 million. Lockhart, supra note 107.
114. Kelly Allen, The Evolution ofMoney Bail ThroughoutHistory, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST.
(Apr.
18
2016), https://www.burnsinstitute.org/blog/the-evolution-of-money-bail-throughout-

history. The practice of cash bail was first developed in the Anglo-Saxon period of England, 4101066. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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morphed into a completely new imposition on defendants. 17 Cash bail
paid in full became a condition for release, and the effects were
immediately and intensely felt by the poor population.! 18 The current cash
bail system has garnered strong opposition by elected officials, and a few
states have enacted legislation and constitutional amendments limiting or
even banning the use altogether.11 9 Moreover, the United States'
privatized system-release from prison conditioned on cash bail-is not
a common practice when compared to other countries.120 In fact, "[t]he
United States is one of only two countries that allow for-profit bail
bonding." 2 1 Even the country where bail originated, the United Kingdom,
does not implement it for-profit. 122
If the arrestee or a close friend or family member is unable to afford
to post bond in full, they may only have two options: (1) stay in prison
until their trial date, or (2) contract with a private company to loan the
amount needed for bail .123 For indigent defendants, after all of the court
proceedings, they could walk away with bail debt owed to a private surety
company and court debt for the numerous fees and costs imposed
throughout the judicial process. 1 2 4

117. Id.
118. Id. Many poor defendants who could not afford bail in full would contract with creditors
who would cover their debt in return for payments with interest rates that poor defendants still had

trouble paying. Id.
119. Joseph Neff, Senators Take Aim at Bail Industry Backers, MARSHALL PROJEcT (Aug. 6
2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/06/senators-take-aim-at-bail-industry-backers;
see also Youngjin Choi, Lessons From CaliforniaandNew Jersey Bail Reform Legislation,N.Y.LJ.
(Dec. 7, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/07/lessons-fromcalifornia-and-new-jersey-bail-reform-legislation.
120. See PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM,
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEFJUS77CE 1, 33 (2017) [hereinafter WORKGROUP]. The only other

country is the Philippines. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.; Allen, supra note 114. The United Kingdom's bail system differs from the United
States system in how it is enforced. The American Bail Bond System, BBC NEWS (July 14, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk-news/5179656.stm. The United Kingdom does not permit the use of
private bail-bondsmen and bounty hunters to track down non-payers. Id.
123. WORKGROUP, supra note 120, at 34-35. Some private bail surety companies require the
arrestee or family member "to collateralize the full amount of the bail with real or personal property."
Id. In California specifically, "[i]f neither the defendant nor the cosigner is able to satisfy these costs
with cash, the bail agent may seize and liquidate any collateral (often the home or personal property
of the defendant, family, or friends) or may attempt to satisfy the debt through other means." Id.
However, California has since made strides to revise its bail system and pledged to stop imposing

cash bail as of October 2019. Choi, supra note 119.
124. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 333; Choi, supra note 119. This debt may even include
payment owed to their public defender. Shapiro, supra note 14.
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4. Incentivized Incarceration
Judicial systems have created such effective revenue streams that
jurisdictions have become increasingly dependent upon them.1 25 Because
the criminal justice system has essentially become for-profit, jurisdictions
will want their judicial systems to collect as much revenue as possible.1 26
By structuring the judicial system in such a way to fund itself, the
government could allocate more money to other programs or parts of the
government.1 2 7 The fees that criminal defendants must pay often fund
unrelated or seemingly superfluous state and local government projects .128
In Allegan County, Michigan, a man had to pay a one thousand dollar
general "court costs" fee after he pleaded guilty to forging a prescription
of pain medication.1 29 Half of this fee reimbursed the public defender fund,
which employed his court-appointed attorney, and the other half went to
general operating costs of the court, including the funding for a gym for
county employees.' 30 In Louisiana's Orleans Parish Criminal District
Court, judges are able to impose multiple fees at various stages of the
court proceedings.131 Most of the revenue from these fees goes to a general
fund accessible by the court.1 32 These fees pay the salaries of some court
officials, and the same judges who imposed the fees are able to access the
revenue through benefits for themselves and their spouses.1
The Department of Justice released a report in 2015 detailing and
criticizing the criminal justice policies of the town of Ferguson,
Missouri.13 4 The report found, among other things, that the law

enforcement and criminal justice procedures and policies were based on
generating revenue instead of promoting public safety.'13 More than 20%
of Ferguson's municipal revenue came from a "system of ticketing and
criminalization that targeted the black population overwhelmingly."' 3 6
125.
126.

See Beitsch, supra note 83; Diller, supra note 95.
Diller, supra note 95.

127. See id.
128. Shapiro, supra note 14.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131.

Vanessa Romo, Federal Judge Rules Against Imprisoning Those Who Can't Pay Court

Fees, NPR (Aug. 6, 2018, 9:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/06/636187743/federal-judgerules-against-imprisoning-those-who-cant-pay-court-fees.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpressDEPARTMENT 1, 43-62 (Mar. 2015),
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson-police-departmentreport.pdf.

135. Id.
136. Janine Jackson, 'They Are Incentivized to Arrest People Because It Raises Money',
FAIRNESS & ACCURACY IN REPORTING (Aug. 12, 2016), https://fair.org/home/they-are-incentivized-
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The rapid deterioration of the relationship between police officers and
citizens of Ferguson witnessed after the shooting of Michael Brown is
attributable to the years of subsidizing the local economy through
excessive fines and fees imposed on those citizens. 137 Donna Murch, an
author and a professor of history at Rutgers University, found that the
government's "resource extraction" policy through incarceration was to
blame for the escalating tension between the Ferguson citizens and the
police.' 3 8 She further contends that this policy targeting the black
population is an example of the evolution of the racist criminal policies
seen directly after the Civil War.13 9
III. STATE INDIGENT STATUS DETERMINATION SCHEMES:
PROBLEMATIC IN EXECUTION AND EFFECT

Indigent status determination schemes that states have implemented
within their judicial systems can be classified into three categories:
discretionary, bright-lined, and a combination between the two.140
Because there is no formal indigent status standard imposed on the
states 141 the effects of indigent status and subsequent treatment of
indigent defendants after conviction vary among the states .142 States are
split as to whether fee waivers and court-appointed attorneys are both
categorized under indigent status .143 Some states have the process of
waiving fees and other court costs for the inability to pay separate from
the determination of indigent status-thus having court-appointed
attorneys as the only benefit of claiming indigent status.'"
This Part discusses the drawbacks that completely discretionary tests
have on the integrity of the indigent status determination scheme:
potential bias from the decision-makers and a likelihood of inconsistent
determinations of similarly situated defendants .14 This Part also
concentrates on the effects that an incorrect determination, or even a
correct determination, of lackluster indigent status could have on a poor

to-arrest-people-because-it-raises-money.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see supra Part H.B.1.
140. See Phillips, supra note 4, at 687-92.
141. See supra Part II.A.
142.

See generally WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF L., PROJECT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CLINIC (Nov.

2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrativellegal-aid-indigent-defendants/
ls sclaid def indigent status-guidelineswash-uscrim just-clinic-project.authcheekdam.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See infra Part III.A.
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defendant.1 46 Specifically, this Part will discuss the problems that occur
when indigent status does not compel the waiver of all fees and costs
associated with the representation, and the court procedures that are
currently used to compel all criminal defendants, indigent or not, to pay
court-issued financial obligations.1
A.

The Completely DiscretionaryDetermination
Test Invites Potentialfor Bias

1. Judges' Conflict of Interest as Decision-Makers
The discretionary test for indigent status is the most popular test
among the states, with twenty states granting full discretion to decisionmakers and twenty-five granting full discretion with guidelines.14 8
Currently, thirty-two states have appointed judges as the decision-makers
of defendants' indigent status.1 49 Because of the incentivized incarceration
programs present throughout the nation, there is a strong conflict of
interest for these judges.5 0 In Cain v. City of New Orleans,' the court
asserted that the defendant deserved to have a neutral forum to decide
whether or not he was deserving of indigent status.1 5 2 Judges are able to
use their discretion to waive fees, but most of the time they will subject
poorer defendants to payment plans.1' These plans often come with
interest, additional fees tacked on, and punishment for missing
deadlines.'54 If judges are able to tap into the revenue stream attained
through the imposition of court fees, wouldn't many of them want to use
their discretion to find that a defendant is able to afford the costs imposed
by the court?' 5

Considering the extremely high standard of ethical responsibility
required by judges, it could be an ethical gray area for a judge to determine
indigent status in that situation.1 5 6 Judges have a higher ethical standard
than attorneys regarding conflicts of interest under the ABA's model
146.
147.
148.
149.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.C.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 687-92.
Id.

150.

Smith, supra note 24, at 2313; see supra Part II.B.4.

151.
152.

No. 15-4479, 2017 WL 467685 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2017).
Id. at *18. "[The] Court finds that plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the bond fee system

described .. . and implemented by the Sheriff is inconsistent with the right to an impartial judge
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.

153. Shapiro, supra note 14.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156.

See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

1448

[Vol. 47:1433

ethics rules.15 7 Under the circumstances mentioned above, there is a
reasonable argument to be made that the judge's financial interest in
finding that a potentially indigent defendant is able to pay court feesthus allowing their fees to be accessed by the judge-creates an
"appearance of impropriety.""' "Public confidence in the judiciary is
eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of
impropriety."' 5 9 By allowing judges to continue deciding whether a
defendant is able to pay in these circumstances, states are increasing the
likelihood of ethical violations occurring. 160
2. Public Defenders' Conflict of Interest as Decision-Makers
Currently, thirteen states have the public defender assigned to the
6
defendant's case as the decision-maker of their indigent status.' ' Fortythree states have programs in which defendants can be billed for having
public defenders, and those fees help fund the state's public defender
program. 62 In Louisiana, there is a scheme in which defendants who plead
63
or are found guilty must pay a thirty-five dollar fee.1 This fee goes
directly to the public defender fund.'" The former defendants claimed that
their public defenders had a competing interest in advising them to plead
65
Additionally, in
guilty, which in turn supplemented their salary.1
a defendant's
on
authority
Louisiana, public defenders are the final
indigent status .166 Thus, there is an incentive among public defenders to
find that their client is able to pay the court fees so they can contribute to
their own salaries. 167

157. See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 & 1.8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2018). Under
federal law, federal judges must recuse themselves from matters in which their impartiality might

reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C.

§ 455

(2012).

158. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2.
159. Id. cmt. 1. Furthermore, the Model Rules do not explicitly give examples for the term
"conduct." Id. cmt. 3. The Rule is "necessarily cast in general terms." Id.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See id.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 687-92.
Shapiro, supra note 14.
Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.at714-15.
Phillips, supra note 4, at 689. Judges in Louisiana give the initial determination of indigent

status. Id. Moreover, although not particularly related to this Note, it is problematic that public
defenders, whose role is to give poor defendants their constitutionally-mandated defense, are able to
supplement their salary by convincing defendants to plead guilty. See Phillips,supra note 4, at 689.
In other words, if these defendants are found innocent, then no fee is collected by the public defenders.
See Phillips, supra note 4, at 689.

167.

Smith, supra note 24, at 2313.
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B. Completely DiscretionaryTests Create
Contradictingand ImproperJudgments
By subjecting defendants to completely discretionary tests, similarly
financially-situated defendants could receive different judgments
depending solely on the decision-maker appointed to their cases. 168 In
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, the "lack of clear and uniform standards
on what constitutes ability to pay" has led to seemingly unconstitutional
results .169 According to state rules, a judge is only able to detain a criminal
defendant for not paying fees if he or she finds that the defendant is
actually able to pay and has chosen not to.17 0 Because there is "no
universal standard," judges will differ in their approach to evaluating the
ability to pay.' 7 ' Judges will consider a variety of factors present in the
defendant's case as to whether they could in fact pay .172 These factors
differ from case to case and different judges place emphasis on different
factors.1 7 3 Some judges consider whether the defendant's family has
money, or if the defendant has purchased alcohol, cigarettes, or other
"luxury" items in lieu of paying the court fees.1 7 4 Absent clear standards,
judges are able to impose their own standards of a necessary purchase
onto a poor defendant's life.' 7 5 This is problematic, especially considering
the wealth gap between judges and impoverished citizens, as well as the
implicit socioeconomic bias prevalent in the judiciary .176 Furthermore,
there is no indication as to whether these judges inquired into or
considered whether these defendants suffer from addiction, which would
have shined some light on how "necessary" the purchase was.' More
carefully tuned standards should be applied to the decision-maker and

168.

See Phillips, supra note 4, at 655.

169. Kate Giammarise & Christopher Huffaker, Jailed Over Unpaid Fines, Court Costs:
Debtors' Prisons?,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 24,2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/pennsylvania/articles/201 8-02-24/jailed-over-unpaid-fines-court-costs-debtors-prisons.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

176. See supra Part II.B.L
177. See Giammarise & Huffaker, supranote 169. Moreover, judges should not consider making
these types of purchases prior to court payments as an outright negative factor due to the correlation
of poverty and addiction. See Bill M., Drug Addiction and Poverty: Understandingthe Connection,
MONARCH SHORES (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.monarchshores.com/food-for-thought/drugaddiction-and-poverty. The lack of access to rehabilitation services perpetuates addiction within
impoverished communities. Id. "If there are no financial resources, there is no access to a rehab center,
which can put a person at risk of dying from an overdose or spiraling out of control and becoming
lost in their addiction forever." Id.
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effects of indigent status because the stakes are so high.1 7 8 As University
of Pittsburgh School of Law professor David Harris stated, "[t]he
Constitution is very clear, the law is very clear, you cannot be jailed for
79
failing to pay when you can't pay."1
Because judges have differing opinions on what being able to pay
means, defendants who likely should be considered for indigent status
80
Tom Barrett was arrested in Augusta,
may slip through the cracks.o
Georgia, for stealing a two-dollar can of beer.'"' Instead of prison time, he
was given twelve months of probation and ordered to wear an alcoholmonitoring bracelet.1 82 He was also ordered to pay an eighty-dollar startup
fee for this program, and since he was living off of food stamps at the
8
After he
time, he could not afford the fee and spent one month in jail.
was released back into probation, he had monthly payments of nearly
$400 of supervision fees .184 When Barrett fell behind in these payments
he was sentenced to twelve months in prison.'
Stephen Papa was a homeless Iraq war veteran in his twenties when
he was arrested for crimes related to climbing on the roof of an abandoned
building. 86 One month after his arrest, Papa owed $2600 in fines,
restitution, and court fees. 8 7 When the judge sought an installment
payment of fifty dollars, Papa only had twenty-five dollars, but he also
had a newly-acquired promising job at a steel factory .1 However,
because he could not pay the installment that the judge wanted, he was

178.

Giammarise & Huffaker, supra note 169.

179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Erin Fuchs, ExorbitantProbationFees Put Georgia Man in an Impossible Catch-22, BUS.
INSSDER (Feb. 6, 2014, 1:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/human-rights-watch-report-on-

for-profit-probation-2014-2.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. Curiously, the funds being raised by Barrett's sentence were not being collected by the
State. Id. Instead, the State had sold the collection rights to Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, a private
entity. Id. Barrett was able to keep up with these payments for a while by gaining as much income as
he could, including donating blood plasma twice a week. Id.
185. Id. He was released after he served two months. Profiles of Those Forced to 'Pay or Stay',

NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/310710716/profiles-of-thoseforced-to-pay-or-stay.
186. Joseph Shapiro, Supreme CourtRuling Not Enough to PreventDebtors Prisons,NPR (May
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/313118629/supreme-court-ruling-not-enough-to2014),
21,
prevent-debtors-prisons. Papa spent the day drinking with friends, and when they climbed onto an
abandoned roof, they were arrested by police. Id.

187. Id.
188. Id.
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sentenced to twenty-two days in jail.1 89 When Papa was released from jail,
he lost his job. *9
Although giving complete discretion to a decision-maker may invite
bias to play a role in the determination and lead to inconsistent judgments
of similarly situated defendants, completely objective tests have the
potential to be just as problematic.191 In New Jersey, there has been
criticism from multiple civil rights groups about the State's use of a riskassessment computer program in the decision of whether a defendant may
qualify for bail or will be detained prior to trial. 192 Opponents claim that
programs like the one being implemented by New Jersey have a potential
for defective determinations due to the prejudicial nature of the data.1 93
The imposition of this algorithm is a result of the amendment made to
New Jersey's Constitution in 2014, allowing the pretrial detention for
certain criminal defendants without an opportunity for bail.1 9 4 A
representative of the American Civil Liberties Union mentioned that other
states are looking to the effectiveness of New Jersey's program to
within
programs
consider implementing similar
potentially
their jurisdictions.9
C.

The Effects of Indigent Status

Determinations of a defendant's indigent status should be done
correctly and unbiasedly because court and attorney fees can have intense
and long-lasting effects on poorer populations .196 Courts can seek payment
from criminal defendants
189.
190.
191.

-regardless

of indigent status-in various

Id.
Id.
See Colleen O'Dea, Civil Rights CoalitionCallsfor End to Core Element of NJ Bail Reform,

NJ SPOTLIGHT (July 31, 2018). https://www.njspotlight.com/stories/18/07/30/civil-rights-groupscall-for-end-to-core-element-of-nj-bail-reform. For a portrayal of these issues in the entertainment
industry, consider an episode of the legal drama For the People.See Forthe People: 18 Miles Outside
Roanoke (ABC television broadcast Mar. 27, 2018). In this particular episode, a judge was
determining the sentence for a young indigent defendant. Id. The judge was planning on using risk
assessment software that utilized an objective algorithm, which calculated the likelihood of the
defendant to commit a crime in the future, or his chance of recidivism. Id. However, the public
defender argued that the judge's subjective opinion in sentencing decisions is what led to her
recidivism rate being considerably lower than that of the algorithm. Id. Potential reasons for the lower

statistic likely included the judge's experience and ability to consider intrinsic factors not easily
quantifiable. Id.
192.

O'Dea, supra note 191.

193.

Id.

194. Id. The civil rights groups criticize not only the use of the fully-objective program, but also
the lack of New Jersey's transparency about the effectiveness of the program. Id.
195. See id. Considering states are interested in implementing similar bail systems, the trend of
completely objective tests with little human input could spread to other areas of criminal law. Id.
196. See supra Part I.B.
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forms of fees, some of which are ordered after judgment seeking to
reimburse the government for the cost of representation, having a trial, or
administrative services .197 These fees may be imposed upon defendants as
court-imposed debts and/or conditions for probation.1 98
Because most indigent defendants are still susceptible to these court
costs and fees, and since most indigent status statutes do not outright
waive all court costs and fees, indigent defendants may be subjected to
additional punishment if they fail to pay their court debts.199 Although
most courts have the option to waive fees for indigent defendants, many
will instead require them to follow a payment plan, often with interest,
and subject to a violation of their probation if they fail to keep up with
these payments. 2 00 The Supreme Court case Bearden v. Georgia201 made
it clear that judges may not sentence someone to prison simply for failing
2
to pay court fees unless that refusal to pay was "willful." 20 The Bearden
court did not explicitly state what the standard for "willful" should entail,
causing differing interpretations among jurisdictions. 203 Thus, if an
indigent status statute does not provide an indigent defendant with a
complete waiver of court costs and fees, judges could evaluate every
expense a defendant exercised as a factor, moving them closer toward a
willful refusal to pay court debt. 2 04
The system of imposing expensive court costs against defendants is
meant to serve a deterrent effect to dissuade them from committing crimes
in the future. 2 0 5 Instead, expensive court costs can steer indigent
defendants to commit additional crimes and take extraordinary measures
to evade the authorities.20 6 Most of these costs appear in the following two
categories: recoupment and contribution.20 7

197. Shapiro, supra note 14.
198. Anderson, supra note 6, at 333.
199. See generally WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF L., supra note 142. Illinois' indigent status statute is
one exception to this generalization, as it specifically allows for a complete waiver of all fees through
a rule. Id.
200. See id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 14.
201. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
202. Id. at 668.
203. Shapiro, supra note 14.
204. See id.; Giammarise & Huffaker, supra note 169.
205. Shapiro,supranote 14.
206. Tim Lockette, Court Costs Drive Some Alabama Residents Back to Crime, Study Claims,
ANNISTON STAR (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.annistonstar.com/news/calhoun/court-costs-drivesome-alabama-residents-back-to-crime-study/article_21d98096-cd22-1 1e8-b66e4f5ef80a4bl6.html; Robert Siegel, Court Fees Drive Many Poor Defendants Underground, NPR
(May 21, 2014), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld=314607003.
207. Anderson, supra note 6, at 329.
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1. Recoupment
Recoupment refers to the judicial order in which a court seeks
reimbursement in full or in part of the services they provided to the
defendant in order to have a trial.2 08 Recoupment statutes governing how
to calculate the amount owed vary from state to state.20 9 The Supreme
Court has ruled on the validity of an Oregon recoupment statute in the
landmark decision of Fuller v. Oregon.2 10 The statute provided that the
state could seek reimbursement of the costs of a court-appointed attorney
if the defendant was convicted. 2 1 1 The challenger claimed that because
there is a possibility that a poor defendant would have to pay for an
attorney if found guilty, many would not seek to be represented at all, thus
chilling the defendant's constitutional right to an attorney. 2 1 2 The court
rejected this argument due to the procedural safeguards Oregon included
in its statute, most notably the clause that stated only defendants who
could afford to pay would be required to pay .213
Many jurisdictions have loosely interpreted this decision, causing
many defendants to not be given the procedural safeguards the Fuller
Court used as the primary reason for upholding the statute's
constitutionality .214 The Fuller Court stated, "Oregon's legislation is
tailored to impose an obligation only upon those with a foreseeable ability
to meet it, and to enforce that obligation only against those who actually
become able to meet it without hardship." 2 1 5 The Oregon statute required
the Court to determine an individual's ability to pay before any imposition
of fees.216 This context is either ignored or overlooked by some
jurisdictions which subject individuals to fees without first having an
ability-to-pay hearing .217
In New Jersey and Florida, public defenders are able to file liens on
defendants' property for unpaid attorney's fees without first having an
ability-to-pay hearing .218 A Kansas court held that the state trial court was
not required to determine whether a defendant was able to pay a onehundred-dollar application fee. 2 19 The Alaska Supreme Court upheld a

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 324.
Id. at 330.
417 U.S. 40,43 (1974).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 49-50.
Anderson, supra note 6, at 337-38.
Id. at 338 (quoting Fuller, 417 U.S. at 54).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 344.
Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 9

1454

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1433

judgment requiring the payment of unpaid court-appointed attorney's fees
when there was no inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay .220 The
relevant Alaskan statute never required an inquiry into the ability to pay
unless the defendant formally objected. 2 2 1 The same recoupment practices
are utilized by states that have an obligation to pay these fees as a
condition for parole or probation. 2 2 2 Some states have gone so far from the
decision in Fullerby only requiring an ability-to-pay determination before
a state seeks to enforce a recoupment order. 2 23 Specifically, Washington
considers the ability to pay as forward-looking: "[C]ommon sense dictates
that a determination of ability to pay and an inquiry into defendant's
finances is not required before a recoupment order may be entered against
an indigent defendant as it is nearly impossible to predict ability to pay
over a period of 10 years or longer." 2 24
2. Contribution
Contribution refers to various forms of fees that often supplement
recoupment efforts .225 These are referred to as administrative fees and
represent a finite amount usually imposed unilaterally across the board,
but are able to be waived. 2 26 Twenty-seven states require indigent
defendants to pay registration fees upfront ranging from ten dollars to
five-hundred dollars depending on the circumstances. 2 2 7 Although the
copays and application fees offered in lieu of hiring a private attorney
seem like a very good deal to many poor citizens, when compared to the
actual cost the government spends on public defenders, these fees likely
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 345.
224. Id. (quoting State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1220 (Wash. 1997)).
225. Id. at 346.
226. Id.
227. Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for
Indigent CriminalDefense, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2045, 2052-53 (2006). The following are statewide upfront public defender registration costs: Arkansas' fee is no more than $100, no less than $50;
Colorado's fee is $25; Connecticut's fee is $25; Delaware's fee is $50; Florida's fee is $40; Indiana's
fee is $50 for a misdemeanor and $100 for a felony; Kentucky's fee is $50 plus a $2.50 clerk handling
fee; Massachusetts' fee is $200; New Jersey's fee is $200; New Mexico's fee is $10; North Dakota's
fee is $25; Oklahoma's fee is $40; Oregon's fee is $20; South Carolina's fee is $25; Tennessee's fee
is no more than $200, no less than $50; Vermont's fee is $25; and Wisconsin's fee is no more than
$400, no less than $200. ABA COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, PUBLIC DEFENDER
APPLICATION FEES 2, 5-20 (2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/
legal-aid-indigent-defendants/downloads/indigentdefense/pdapplicationfees2001 narrative.pdf.
The following are examples of states that have a county-based approach to upfront public defender
costs: Arizona's counties range from $250 to $500; California's counties range from $50 to $120;
Georgia's counties range from $20 to $200; Ohio's counties range from $30 to $75; and Washington's
counties impose a $25 fee. Id. at 20-25.
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have the potential to exceed that cost.2 28 These contribution fees differ
229
from recoupment in that they are generally waivable by the court.
However, there is no requirement to have an ability-to-pay determination
prior to the potential waiver of contribution fees .230 Further, if contribution
fees do not get waived, they become enforced as a part of the defendant's
sentence, conditions for probation, or another court order. 23 1 Thus,
contribution debt for various fees may accumulate against a defendant
without any inquiry into their ability to pay.232
IV.

A MODEL INDIGENT STATUS STANDARD WILL PROVIDE CLARITY,
UNIFORMITY, AND FAIRNESS TO POOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

As discussed, the majority of the current indigent status statutes lend
themselves to bias and potential conflicts of interest of the decisionmakers and lack the necessary effects to prevent undue hardship to
indigent defendants .233 This Part introduces the underlying principles and
rationales of the proposed model standard for indigent status
determinations .234 Further, this Part includes a model rule for indigent
status determinations that have been developed from various aspects of
23 5
different states' indigent status statutes.
A.

A Neutral Third Party as the Decision-Maker

A party unrelated to the current matter should be the one to determine
whether an individual meets the standard to remove any chance of bias
from the occasion. 2 36 Allowing the judge or public defender assigned to
the case as the decision-maker of indigent status leaves the door open to
37
potential bias, including conflicts of interest, tainting the determination.2

228.

See Anderson, supranote 6, at 353.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 346.
Id.
Id.
Id.

233.

See supra Part1H.

234. See infra Part IV.A-C.
235. See infra Part IV.D.
236.
237.

See supra PartIII.
See id. This rationale is consistent with the holding in Cain v. City of New Orleans,No. 15-

4479, 2017 WL 467685 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2017) at *18 (stating in part, that a defendant should be
given a neutral forum to determine his or her indigent status).
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B. A Mixed Bright-Line and Discretionary
Standardfor Indigent Status
The model standard for indigent status should be based off the
standard currently applied by Maryland. 23 8 This test is a combination of
discretionary guidelines with presumptive thresholds which automatically
qualifies certain defendants .239 Decision-makers using this type of test are
able to utilize the best benefits of completely discretionary tests and
bright-line tests .24 Discretionary components allow the decision-maker to
consider an individual's unforeseen and changing circumstances. 241
Bright-line rule components give a considerable amount of efficiency,
predictability, and uniformity to the results and notice to the individual
being evaluated. 24 2 Hopefully, by combining the aspects of both tests, the
negative aspects of each will be reduced .243 For example, a large drawback
of bright-line rules is that they consider a few criteria as very important,
controlling the result, and may potentially ignore other criteria that are
just as important. 2 1 By complementing clear parameters with relevant
discretionary factors to consider for the cases that fall in an ethical gray
area, decision-makers will be able to take these important components
into account. 2 4 5 Regardless of whether the defendant is found innocent or
guilty, they should not be subjected to numerous fees if they are found to
be indigent. 2 4 6
C.

The ABA's Guidelines on Court Fines and Fees

The ABA formed the Task Force on Building Public Trust in the
American Justice System ("Task Force") in 2016 to respond to growing
societal disapproval of criminal justice policies in America. 2 4 7 The Task
Force had determined that by addressing exorbitant court fines and fees,
it could have the greatest impact on their goal of building back public

238.

See WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF L., supra note 142.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
See Phillips,supra note 4, at 669.
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 663, 669.
Id.

247. ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 88, report at 1. Specifically, these concerns
included increasing racial tensions, retaliation against law enforcement, and growing distrust of the
judicial system as a whole. Id. The Task Force had three primary goals to guide their research and
recommendations: (1) encourage the adoption of new practices for criminal justice reform, (2)
establish a consensus on which reforms needed to be achieved, and (3) educate the public as to how
the new procedures would change the criminal justice system. Id.
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trust. 2 4 8 Specifically, the Task Force found that "the imposition and
enforcement of these fines and fees have disproportionately harmed the
millions of Americans who cannot afford to pay them, entrenching
poverty, exacerbating racial and ethnic disparities, diminishing trust in our
justice system, and trapping people in cycles of punishment simply
because they are poor." 2 4 9 The Task Force developed ten Guidelines to
help guide government officials and other lawmakers in addressing and
reforming existing laws and developing new laws regarding court fines
and fees. 250 The ABA's ten Guidelines can be broken down into four
general categories: (1) limitations on fees, (2) limitations on sanctions for
the nonpayment of fees, (3) regulations of the ability-to-pay standard, and
(4) general applicability of the Guidelines .251
1. Limitations on Fees
Guideline 1 of the ABA recommendations is for lawmakers to
impose limitations on the purpose and amount of fees.252 The fees "must
be related to the justice system and the services provided to the
individual." 25 3 Currently, states impose fees whose proceeds help fund
unrelated programs and accounts .254 These various programs include
libraries, the Crime Victims' Rights Fund, retirement plans for judges,
construction of new law schools, state police, and emergency medical air
transportation, among other things. 25 5 These funding purposes are in
addition to the common practice of raising revenue to support the court
system itself. 25 6 The ABA found that because the judicial system serves
the entire public, it "should be entirely and sufficiently funded by general
government revenue ."257
Guideline 1 also recommends limiting the amount and types of fees
that defendants should be subject to. 2 5 8 The Task Force discusses the
imposition of "user fees" and "collection fees" in the connection of a
criminal offense or conviction. 25 9 It recommends that all such fees should
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.

251.

ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 88, report at 3. Also included in these

Guidelines is a discussion on the limitation of fines, but because the topic of this Note primarily deals
with fees (not fines), that discussion has been omitted. Id.
252. Id. at 1.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1, 10 nn.1 & 3; see supra Part IIB.4.
255. Id.
256. See supra Part IL.B.4.
257.

ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 88, at 2.

258.
259.

Id.
Id. User fees are surcharges applied to a defendant's case and include examples such as
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be eliminated, and if imposed at all, must not be considered a substantial
hardship relative to the financial circumstances of the individual.260 The
Task Force more sternly contends that when an individual is found not
able to pay, the courts should not inflict fees. 2 6 1 Such fees include those
for: probation, payment plans, diversion programs, community service, or
appointment of counsel .262
2. Limitations on Sanctions for the Nonpayment of Fees
ABA Guidelines 3 and 5 aim to prohibit courts from subjecting
individuals to disproportionate sanctions for simply not paying their
court-imposed debts.263 Specifically, Guideline 3 asserts that incarceration
should never be a sanction, and suspension of a driver's license is
considered "out of proportion." 2 1 Guideline 5 prohibits a sanction for the
nonpayment of court costs (willful or not) that deprives an individual's
fundamental rights. 265 The rights mentioned include the right to vote and
to the custody and control of one's children. 266 The Task Force made the
argument that collecting fines and fees is not a valid government interest
when the sanction deprives a fundamental right.267
Guideline 6 suggests that the court must consider alternatives to
disproportionate sanctions when the individual is found not able to pay,
and any alternative must be reasonable .268 Some proposed examples of
appropriate alternatives are an extension of time to pay, a reduction of the
amount owed, and a waiver of the amount owed. 2 69 Further, any nonmonetary alternatives, like community service, must be appropriate for
the individual's circumstances .270 The court must consider the individual's
financial, mental, and physical capacity, and if there would be any undue
interference with their existing responsibilities (for example, caregiving
or employment) .271

"supervision fees" and "drug testing fees." Id. "Collection fees" are payable to private collection firms
for the cost of collecting fees. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 3-5.
264. Id. at 6-7.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 8. In Georgia, for example, a person convicted of a felony is required to pay all
outstanding court debt before they are permitted to vote, essentially acting as a poll tax. Id. at 9.
267. Id. at 9.
268. Id. at 10.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 11.
271. Id.
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3. Regulations Regarding the Ability-to-Pay Standard
Guideline 7 establishes parameters to follow when adopting an
ability-to-pay standard. 2 7 2 The standard must be "clear and consistent" and
must consider at a minimum the following factors when determining
whether an individual is, in fact, able to pay:
receipt of needs-based or means-tested public assistance; income
relative to an identified percentage of the Federal Poverty Guidelines;
homelessness, health or mental health issues; financial obligations and
dependents; eligibility for a public defender or civil legal services; lack
of access to transportation; current or recent incarceration; other fines
and fees owed to courts; any special circumstances that bear on a
person's ability to pay; and whether payment would result in manifest
hardship to the person or dependents .273
In addition to regulating what the actual standard must include, the
guidelines also suggest how the standard should be applied and the effects
it should have.274 Guideline 4 suggests the courts must have an ability-topay hearing before any fees or sanctions for non-payment of fees,
including incarceration, are imposed upon an individual. 275 Further, courts
must provide "adequate and meaningful notice" of these hearings, along
with appropriate advising of all the pertinent rights of the individual .276 As
to the effect of finding that an individual does not have the ability to pay,
Guideline 8 supposes that an indigent defendant must be provided counsel
"without cost" and that such counsel be provided for all proceedings
whenever incarceration could be the result. 2 77 Further, the Task Force
rejects that the cost of providing counsel incurred by the court is a valid
justification for failing to provide counsel when it is required by law. 2 7 8
4. General Applicability
The ABA recommends that all information regarding court fines and
fees should be publicly available. 2 7 9 Ultimately, the ABA requests
transparency from the court regarding: the court's revenue received from
fees imposed; the amount of fees imposed, waived, and collected in each
case; any cost the court incurred from imposing non-monetary

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
require a
278.
279.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8. Specifically, the commentary notes the right to counsel. Id.
Id. at 11. This Guideline is in direct opposition to the practice of twenty-seven states that
registration fee for a public defender. See supra Part lI.C.2.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
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alternatives; and data regarding the demographics of the individuals
ordered to pay these fees.280 Further, Guideline 10 mandates that any
designation of collection rights for fees to private companies must involve
strict oversight. 281 Because it is a common occurrence for jurisdictions to
sell contracts to private entities to govern probation or diversion
programs, it is imperative that the government ensure their practices avoid
harmful behavior, including charging interest, reselling collection rights,
2 82
and intimidation, among other types of conduct.
D.

The Model Rule

The following model statute has two primary goals of enforcement:
(1) the model statute is intended to create uniform and accurate findings
of indigent status by neutral decision-makers, and (2) the model statute
will increase the effectiveness of an affirmative finding of indigent
status .283 Together, these aims will make it less likely that an indigent
defendant will suffer debt-related injuries by simply defending himself in
criminal court. 284 The language of the statute is based off of, and has been
modified from, various state indigent status statutes and the ABA
recommendations on criminal fines and fees. 285 The proposed language is
as follows:
1.

Indigent Status Determination

A. A potential indigent criminal defendant will automatically qualify
for indigent status if:
(1) the defendant or any dependent of the defendant who resides in
the same household as the defendant receives means-tested state
or federal governmental benefits,286 or
(2) the defendant's net yearly income is less than 200% of the
federal poverty guidelines .287
B. Notwithstanding Subdivisions A(1) and A(2) of this Section, a neutral
third-party must determine whether a potential indigent defendant
qualifies for indigent status. The neutral third-party shall:
(1) not have any role or interest in the defendant's case besides to
determine indigent status; and
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
See infra Part IV.D.1-2.

285. See infra Part IV.D.1-2; see also supra Part IV.C. See generally WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF L.,
supra note 142.
286. See WASH. UNIV. SCH. OFL., supra note 142.

287. See id. This Subdivision is based off of Florida's indigent status statute. See id.
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(2) determine whether the disposable income and assets of the
defendant are insufficient to retain competent private counsel
without substantial hardship to the defendant. 288
C. The neutral third-party as identified in Subdivision B(1) of this
Section shall abide by the following guidelines in determining whether
the defendant may qualify for indigent status 289:
(1) a defendant's financial ability to pay shall be measured in terms
of the defendant's individual resources and not in terms of the
defendant's family's resources;
(2) the fact that bond was posted shall not be used as grounds to
deny indigent status;
(3) assets seized in raids and held by authorities may not be
considered available to the defendant and thus may not be used
to prove his or her ability to pay;
(4) the defendant's presumed employability shall form no proper
basis to deny indigent status; and
(5) any doubts as to whether the defendant qualifies for indigent
status shall be resolved by finding indigent status rather than
denying it.
D. The neutral third-party as identified in Subdivision B(1) of this
Section shall conduct an evaluation of the indigent defendant's ability
to pay before any imposition of a fee or sanction for nonpayment
of fees.290

2. Effect of Indigent Status
If the defendant meets the test in Section 1(A), or if the neutral thirdparty identified in Section 1(B)(1) determines that the potential indigent
defendant qualifies for indigent status, then 291:
A. If the defendant requests the assistance of counsel for his or her
defense, the public defender will be appointed to his or her case;
and
B. The court shall enter an order allowing the defendant to defend
his or her case without the payment of fees, costs, or charges.
(1) This order shall cover all administrative charges, including
any reimbursement or contribution efforts related to the costs
of representation.

288.

See id. This Subdivision is based off of Minnesota's indigent status statute. See id.

289. See id. The following factors are based on those identified by the Court of Special Appeals
in Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058 (1982), and subsequently adopted by the Maryland Legislature.
See id.
290. See supra Part IV.C. This clause is based off of Guideline 4 proposed by the Task Force.
See supra Part IV.C.
291. See WASH. UNIV. SCH. OF L., supra note 142. The following results are based on the
indigent status statute and rules of Illinois. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 9

1462

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1433

(2) This order shall not excuse any criminal fine imposed
against a guilty defendant as determined by the legislature.
V.

CONCLUSION

The current policies of the United States criminal justice system
require substantial changes to attain socioeconomic equity because
currently, the system is broken .292 The United States' prison system
accounts for 21% of the world's prisoners while the United States
population only accounts for 5% of the world's population .29 Today, the
United States prison population for drug-related offenses is greater than
the entire prison population in 1980.294 Further, the sentencing of
individuals for violent and property crimes has increased even though the
rates in which these crimes were committed have decreased .295 In 2015,
4.6 million individuals were on probation or parole in the United States,
and almost 7 million were subject to some form of criminal justice
supervision.296 Reasonable people offer differing approaches on how to
incorporate changes to the system, but most if not all agree that change
is required .297
The model rule proposed above will not, on its own, place
impoverished citizens at the same level as their wealthy counterparts, nor
does it attempt to be the perfect answer to the sum of problems plaguing
our criminal justice system.2 98 Instead, this solution seeks to remove one
troubling piece from the equation, which consistently disadvantages poor
citizens. 29 9 Hopefully, clear, fair, and uniform indigent status standards
will help create a path to future reform and allow our most vulnerable to

292. See Criminal Justice and Equity, GOv'T ALL. ON RACE & EQUITY (Apr. 23, 2016),
https://www.racialequityalliance.org/2016/04/23/criminal-justice-and-equity.
293. CriminalJustice Fact Sheet, supra note 71.
294. Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/
criminal-justice-facts (last updated Aug. 2019).
295. Id.
PROJECT,
Prisons, SENTENCING
Prisons and People in
296. Fact Sheet:
(last
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Facts-About-Prisons.pdf
updated Aug. 2017).
297. See, e.g., Kamala D. Harris, Three Ways To Fix Our CriminalJustice System, TIDAL (Oct.
15, 2018), http://read.tidal.com/article/three-ways-to-fix-our-criminal-justice-system; Jessica S.
Henry, Top 10 Ways to Fix the Criminal Justice System, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 2014),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-s-henry/top-10-ways-to-fix-the-cr-b_6362274.html;
Leading CriminalJustice System Change: The CriticalRole of Local Law Enforcement, INT'L Ass'N
OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/leading-criminal-justice-system-change-

the-critical-role-of-local-law-enforcement (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
298. See supra Part II.
299. See supra Part mI.
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exist within our criminal justice system with one less disadvantage .300 The
judicial system is intended to be an equal, fair, and equitable forum for
every American, which frankly is not our reality .301
The disparate treatment of poor citizens in our criminal justice
system is not a new issue, and to call it a pervasive problem should not be
controversial. 3 02 The topic has been addressed within various spheres of
influence, including the press,3 0 3 academia,3 0 4 and the entertainment
industry.3 0 Regardless of the zealous advocacy for change showcased by
political activists and the majority of Americans recognizing the existence
of a problem, the inequitable application of the law against those in
poverty is widespread and requires sweeping changes with substantial
reevaluations of how our legislators and public officials treat our
country's poor. 30 6 Although there have been strides in a few jurisdictions
to address the inequitable circumstances poor criminal defendants face,
the majority of these efforts address the mishandling of indigent
defendants' cases after the defendants have qualified for indigent status .307

300.
301.
302.

See supra Part IV.
See supra PartI.B.
See supra Part II.

303. See Harry Cheadle, The Rules Are Different for the Rich, VICE (Oct. 6, 2017),
Andrew
Cohen,
https://www.vice.comlen-us/article/ne7yv7/the-rules-are-different-for-the-rich;
How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After 'Gideon', ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counsel-50-

years-after-gideon/273433.
304. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6; Sobol, supra note 64.
305. See How to Get Away with Murder: Lahey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (ABC
television broadcast Mar. 1, 2018). An episode of the popular television show How to Get Away with
Murder portrayed a fictional Supreme Court oral argument focusing on the treatment of indigent
criminal defendants assigned to public defenders. Id. Specifically, the appellant advocated for the
Court to incorporate a stronger imposition of the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Id. Appellant argued that the criminal justice system has treated minority and
impoverished citizens so poorly that they have "been relegated to a subclass of human existence." Id.
Further, she argued that if the Court found for the Commonwealth in this case, it would turn a blind
eye to the invidious mismanagement of the governmental program and effectively dismantle the
constitutional protections they swore an oath to protect. Id.
306. See Greenhouse, supra note 72. "90 percent of respondents said affluent people and
corporations had an unfair advantage in court." Id.; see also Stephen Lurie, Why It Matters that
(June
2,
2014),
ATLANTIC
of
Poverty,
Have
No
Experience
Politicians
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/why-it-matters-that-politicians-have-noexperience-of-poverty/371857.
NEWS
(Nov.
5,
2018),
Kaitlin
Ryan,
A
Fairer Fight, ALPENA
307. See
http://www.thealpenanews.com/news/local-news/2018/1 1/a-fairer-fight; Bruce Vielmetti, 'I'm Going
to Stand Up': Northern Wisconsin Judge Demands Answers from State on Public Defender Crisis,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2018/1 1/01/
northern-wisconsin-judge-demands-answers-public-defender-crisis/1 805271002.
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While it is very important to ensure indigent defendants are .being
provided with equitable treatment during the course of their
representation, it should be just as imperative that they receive a fair and
unbiased evaluation of their eligibility in the first place.308 And if they are
found eligible, they must not be subject to the costs incurred by
their representation.309
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